Since the last quarter of 2024, the Lebanese state has been undergoing one of the most critical phases in its history regarding national sovereignty. An analysis of the political performance of the Presidency of the Republic and the executive authority from the ceasefire on 27 November 2024 up to the 2026 war reveals a pattern of diplomatic and field behavior represented by a series of substantive concessions that affected the core of Lebanon’s defense doctrine and the sovereignty of the Lebanese state.
A file prepared by the Union Center for Research and Development addresses the measures related to these concessions, based on field facts, timelines, and diplomatic documents. The file, relying on field facts, timelines, and diplomatic documents, examines the political performance of the Presidency of the Republic and the executive authority, and what it describes as “sovereign concessions” during that phase.
The file notes that 27 November 2024 marked the beginning of a new course in dealing with International Resolution 1701, yet the field and political implementation witnessed, according to the file, deep gaps between sovereign rhetoric and actual practice on the ground.
In this context, the file speaks of a “failure” to send effective and immediate reinforcements for the Lebanese Army to the southern border immediately after the ceasefire took effect, although the agreement stipulated the army’s deployment as the sole and exclusive force. It considers that the official delay in issuing operational orders for deployment allowed the occupation forces to take de facto control of large areas.
It also pointed to the absence of official measures to prevent the occupation from carrying out widespread destruction operations of border villages during the “60-day” period following the agreement — a period which, according to the file, witnessed the destruction of entire villages under the pretext of “clearing infrastructure,” amid official Lebanese silence.
The file also addressed the occupation’s continued control of five strategic points along the southern border after 27 November, considering that the failure to turn this matter into a diplomatic clash constituted “a precedent in conceding Lebanese lands.” Regarding field incursions, the file noted the movement of patrols belonging to the occupation army along main roads passing through Lebanese Army positions and checkpoints, clarifying that top political directives were to avoid any friction, which allowed the occupation, in its words, to entrench a “right of movement” inside Lebanese territory.
It also pointed to the continuation of Israeli assassination operations inside populated civilian areas, noting the recording of around 500 assassinations during the ceasefire period, while the Lebanese authority limited itself to issuing condemnation statements, without taking corresponding escalatory or defensive steps.
Source: Union Center for Research and Development