Recent Iranian attacks on U.S. military facilities in the Gulf region have raised growing questions regarding the future of the U.S. military footprint, which has formed a pillar of Washington’s strategic presence in the Middle East since the 1990s.
According to a Financial Times report by Jacob Judah, the U.S. presence in the Middle East has relied for nearly four decades on a network of large military bases across Gulf states. However, six months of war with Iran have placed the future of these facilities in question.
The report noted that Iran utilized short-range missiles and drones to target U.S. facilities, exposing the vulnerability of massive bases located near the Iranian coastline. This has driven Washington to shift troops and aircraft to locations further out of reach of these weapons, including Israel, Jordan, and other sites.
It highlighted that while the U.S. has enjoyed access to military bases in all major Gulf states for over three decades, it now faces a strategic choice between spending billions of dollars to rebuild damaged facilities or fundamentally reconsidering its entire military posture in the Middle East.
Hal Brands, a scholar at Johns Hopkins University, quoted in the report, noted that large, static military bases have become highly vulnerable to attacks. He expects a redirection of the U.S. military footprint away from the Gulf and away from bases situated within the range of short-range missiles and drones.
Large, permanent military bases have gradually begun losing their prominence in U.S. military planning, as the Pentagon pivots toward more flexible and distributed deployment models that make targeting U.S. forces significantly harder.
The report added that this shift has bolstered long-standing calls to downsize the U.S. military presence in the Gulf—a footprint that for decades served as the military component of a political and security arrangement built primarily around the “oil-for-security” equation between Washington and its regional allies.
It noted that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has already begun testing new operational models, including dispersing soldiers across smaller combat positions and rapidly maneuvering fighter jets between temporary runways and locations.
Dana Stroul, a former senior U.S. defense official for Middle East policy, stated that Washington can adopt a far more flexible military model, arguing that the design of existing Gulf bases reflects an era no longer suited to the nature of modern warfare.
The report pointed out that a significant portion of the U.S. base infrastructure in the Gulf sits above ground, leaving it exposed to attacks. During the conflict, Iran targeted aircraft hangars, supply facilities, radars, and command-and-control centers.
Damage to U.S. facilities prompted the U.S. Fifth Fleet to utilize Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago as an alternative logistics hub to its damaged headquarters in Bahrain.
Nate Swanson, former Director for Iran at the U.S. National Security Council, observed that rebuilding certain sites may no longer be viable or logical. He noted that the high cost of rehabilitating facilities that Washington no longer wishes to maintain could accelerate the ongoing shift of U.S. military weight westward.
According to estimates from the American Enterprise Institute, the cost to repair damage inflicted across 11 U.S. bases in seven Middle Eastern countries reached approximately $5 billion. The Pentagon, however, did not incorporate these expenses into its formal cost projections for the conflict with Iran.
The Financial Times report further highlighted that over the past six months, the U.S. moved troops and equipment into Israel and Jordan, while also operating aircraft and drones out of European bases—locations positioned safely beyond the reach of Iran’s short-range weaponry.
However, it warned that Iran could adapt to these U.S. realignments. Danny Citrinowicz, a former Iran analyst for Israeli military intelligence, predicted Tehran would invest more heavily in developing medium-range missiles capable of striking targets in Israel and Jordan.
The necessity of maintaining a vast basing network in the Gulf has also diminished as the U.S. has sought in recent years to reduce its Middle East commitments and pivot focus toward the Indo-Pacific region.
The report noted Washington’s withdrawal from Syria in April 2026, alongside the gradual reduction of its military presence in Iraq as counter-ISIS operations wound down. Stroul remarked that the U.S. no longer requires Gulf bases in the same manner it once did, pointing out that many operations in Kuwait were directly linked to U.S. missions in Syria and Iraq.
The report observed that any reassessment of U.S. military posture will inevitably impact troop numbers in the Gulf, where roughly 35,000 U.S. service members typically rotate through Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Three former U.S. defense strategists quoted in the report anticipate that troop levels could drop to numbers not seen in the region since before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Nevertheless, scaling back presents Washington with a major strategic dilemma: how to reduce its Gulf footprint without emboldening Iran or stoking fears among Arab allies regarding the U.S. commitment to their security.
While the “oil-for-security” dynamic has evolved over past decades—with several Gulf states diversifying defense partnerships beyond total reliance on Washington—the conflict with Iran has forced allies to re-evaluate the exact nature of the U.S. defense umbrella.
Hal Brands noted that military and diplomatic imperatives are moving in opposite directions: Washington must restructure its military presence while avoiding the perception that it is abandoning the region. Stroul added that Washington will need to strike a delicate balance between operational requirements and partner commitments, determining the right force composition to reassure Gulf partners without giving the impression of withdrawal.
The report linked the future of U.S. bases to a broader strategic crisis stemming from the ongoing confrontation with Iran. The U.S. footprint in the Gulf originally took shape following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution.
In January 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced what became known as the “Carter Doctrine,” pledging that Washington would use military force if necessary to prevent any hostile power from gaining control over the Gulf. This presence expanded dramatically following the First Gulf War.
Gregory Brew, an analyst at Eurasia Group, remarked that the Carter Doctrine appears to have collapsed, noting the historical irony that while the 1979 Islamic Revolution triggered the doctrine’s creation, the current war with Iran has brought about its end.
The report concluded by emphasizing the absence of a clear, new strategic vision for the Middle East to guide U.S. policy moving forward amid the shifts forced by the confrontation with Tehran.
Brands noted that while the Pentagon will draft plans to reorganize U.S. deployments, these plans will likely face friction when reaching the political level under President Donald Trump. He highlighted that Trump has repeatedly expressed a desire to avoid a legacy akin to President Jimmy Carter, whose presidency was severely impacted by the Iranian Revolution and the Tehran hostage crisis.
Concluding the report, Citrinowicz observed the historical irony that a strategic failure in Iran could ultimately haunt Trump as well, stating: “He never wanted to become Carter, but he is now turning into him.”
Source: Financial Times