The final report of the Winograd Commission, which investigated the events of the Second Lebanon War, was one of the most prominent probes that addressed the Israeli political and military failures in commanding the July 2006 war.
The report’s significance stems from the broad powers granted to the Commission, headed by Judge Eliyahu Winograd. Those powers allowed the commission to question most decision-makers at both the political and military levels, as well as to hear testimonies from hundreds of soldiers and officers of various ranks.
In light of the battle of the “Formidable in Might”, the Israeli army repeated almost the same mistakes it made during the July 2006 war, that the Winograd Report had identified and warned against, and even committed greater failures in some aspects.
Initially, the enemy attempted to implement some of the Winograd recommendations, particularly in the intelligence and technical fields, but it quickly reverted to repeating the strategic and operational errors that the report had warned against, and failed to continue implementing the recommendations it had initially applied.
The Zionist Occupation Army also failed to develop effective field intelligence, which enabled the resistance to defeat it through asymmetric warfare, using small formations to disrupt any large-scale offensive maneuvers involving both movement and fire.
The Israeli leadership lacked discipline, with disagreements among officers undermining command unity and the consistency of decision-making. It also failed to prepare suitable battle plans, becoming bogged down in daily adjustments and improvised corrections without a clear operational vision.
It attempted to implement the concept of combined arms maneuver but was outmatched by the resistance’s flexible tactics, including mobile defense, ambushes, the use of anti-tank weapons, and swarm attacks.
During the initial ground maneuver phase of the war, it failed to manage ground engagements and was unable to counter the resistance’s fire maneuvers, which relied heavily on support weapons and swarm attacks.
It started the war with a “rush to victory” mentality, which it later modified to “achieving the image of victory,” instead of adhering to the deliberate and well-planned professional military strategy recommended by the Winograd Commission.
In the “Formidable in Might” battle, the Israeli army believed it had implemented the lessons of the Winograd Commission by initially relying on strategic intelligence. However, it fell into the same operational traps it encountered in the 2006 war as soon as direct ground engagement began.
The enemy failed to achieve a decisive military victory, and instead of a deep invasion, it adopted a “reconnaissance-by-force” approach, advancing and then retreating—a back-and-forth tactic—despite the Winograd Commission’s criticism of hesitation and a lack of decisiveness.
Thus, the enemy’s adherence to the recommendations was merely superficial, with a fundamental failure in practical application. It began the initial phase of the war with advanced strategic intelligence, a significantly larger force, and sophisticated cyber and artificial intelligence technologies. However, once the resistance’s command and control system held firm despite the assassination of some leaders, Israeli planning collapsed, and it reverted to repeating the mistakes of the 2006 war.
Among the most prominent of these failures were the destruction of tanks without adequate infantry cover, the ambushes of special forces due to weak tactical reconnaissance, a state of command confusion with officers publicly exchanging accusations, and the inability to thwart missile and drone attacks until the end of the war.
Thus, the enemy army appeared in the “First Battle” as a technologically advanced force in the air and cyber intelligence domains, but remained tactically weak in ground combat and territorial control—a weakness previously warned against in the Winograd Report, yet which has not been fundamentally addressed.
Source: Union Center for Researches and Development (Edited and Translated by Al-Manar English Website)