Saudi Arabia is facing mounting security and economic pressures as the conflict in the Middle East threatens its oil infrastructure and shipping routes, while its longtime security partner, the United States, appears increasingly unwilling or unable to provide the protection Riyadh has historically relied upon. In an analysis published by Foreign Policy, Nicholas Grossman argues that Saudi Arabia’s decision to place such a heavy strategic bet on President Donald Trump has left the kingdom exposed at a critical moment.
The immediate pressure on Riyadh is substantial. Saudi oil shipments have faced disruption in the Persian Gulf, while shipping remains threatened in the Red Sea. The kingdom’s major East-West oil pipeline was also hit by a drone attack, highlighting the vulnerability of Saudi energy infrastructure despite the country’s enormous defense spending.
For decades, the Saudi-American relationship rested on a broad strategic bargain. Washington provided military protection, deterrence, air-defense assistance and support for freedom of navigation, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states hosted U.S. military facilities, cooperated on counterterrorism and helped maintain the flow of oil. The 1990–91 Gulf War became the clearest example of that arrangement, when a U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait and prevented Iraq from threatening Saudi oil fields.
Grossman argues that the current crisis has exposed serious weaknesses in that traditional security arrangement. According to the article, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought U.S. intervention against the Houthis after attacks on Saudi infrastructure, but Washington declined to expand the conflict in Yemen. The author presents this as evidence that Riyadh can no longer automatically expect Washington to use military power whenever Saudi interests are threatened.
The dispute is particularly significant because Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in its relationship with Trump and his political circle. The article points to Saudi spending at Trump-linked businesses, the lavish reception given to Trump during his first presidential visit to the kingdom and a major arms agreement announced during that trip. It also discusses Saudi financial ties to Jared Kushner and his investment firm.
The relationship appeared to produce important political dividends for Riyadh during Trump’s first presidency. The administration withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, a move welcomed by Saudi Arabia, while Trump also publicly rejected the CIA assessment that Mohammed bin Salman had ordered the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi-linked business interests subsequently expanded their financial connections with Trump-related enterprises.
Saudi Arabia continued strengthening those relationships after Trump returned to office. The article highlights investments by Saudi-linked entities in Trump-owned businesses and the $2 billion investment by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund in Kushner’s investment firm. According to the article, Saudi officials had raised concerns about the investment, but the deal nevertheless went ahead.
Yet the current conflict has complicated the calculation. Grossman argues that Riyadh expected its close relationship with Trump to translate into greater protection, but instead found itself exposed to the consequences of Washington’s military decisions. The author contends that the United States initiated major military action against Iran without achieving its stated political objectives and subsequently sought negotiations rather than pursuing a more extensive military campaign.
The situation has also placed Saudi Arabia in a difficult position regarding Yemen. Riyadh has its own substantial military capabilities and has conducted military operations against the Houthis for years, but the conflict demonstrated the limitations of Saudi forces in defeating the movement. The article argues that this weakness has reinforced the kingdom’s dependence on American military support.
Grossman also identifies one area in which Saudi Arabia may still gain from its relationship with the Trump administration: a potential nuclear agreement that could allow Riyadh to enrich uranium under less restrictive conditions than previous U.S. administrations were willing to accept. The author argues that such an agreement would raise concerns about nuclear proliferation and could complicate Washington’s efforts to restrict Iran’s enrichment capabilities.
The article nevertheless notes that the nuclear arrangement faces political obstacles. Trump has linked the agreement to Saudi recognition of ‘Israel’, while Riyadh has insisted on conditions involving Palestinian statehood. The author further argues that a future U.S. administration could attempt to reverse the arrangement because of both proliferation concerns and questions surrounding the financial relationships between Saudi Arabia and figures close to Trump.
The broader argument of the Foreign Policy analysis is that Riyadh made a strategic calculation that personal relationships and financial influence could substitute for the institutional foundations of a durable U.S.-Saudi security partnership. Grossman argues that this calculation underestimated the consequences of relying on leaders whose decisions may be driven by personal and political considerations rather than long-term national strategy.
The article therefore portrays the current crisis as a larger warning for Saudi Arabia: money and political access may secure short-term influence in Washington, but they cannot guarantee military protection or strategic stability. As regional conflicts increasingly threaten Saudi territory, energy infrastructure and maritime trade, Riyadh faces the difficult task of reassessing how much it can rely on the United States—and whether it needs a more independent security strategy.